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What duty does the citizen owe the state? The government may obviously
impose an array of obligations upon the populace, ranging from paying taxes
to disclosing social security numbers. But the question of under what circum-
stances the government may require us to act in a way that endangers our lives
remains largely unexplored in our jurisprudence. The law concerning police
commands of assistance provides an instructive context for examining this ques-
tion.
Most states statutorily authorize peace officers to command bystanders to
assist them in their law enforcement duties,2 and many make a failure to obey
t Connecticut Superior Court Judge; B.A., Carleton, 1970; J.D., Stanford, 1973. I thank Akhil Amar,
Jean Blue, and Joan Gottschal for their suggestions and encouragement and Zurreen Zubairie for her pains-
taking review of an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (government may require AFDC applicants to provide
Social Security numbers).
2. Statutes authorizing peace officers to command assistance but not criminalizing failures to obey such
commands include ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 107-8 (Smith-Hurd 1980); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 219 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.30 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-5 (1973);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-03 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-105 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.07
(West 1985). Nonpenal statutes mentioning commands of assistance but not themselves expressly authorizing
such commands include IDAHO CODE § 19-205 (1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 41, § 100 (1979); MICH. CoMw.
LAWS ANN. § 123A01 (West 1991). Cf. OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 307.47 (Page 1987) (concerning
automobiles commandeered by police officers).
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such a command a criminal offense.3 The anecdotal,4 experiential,5 and juris-
prudential6 information available suggests that these laws are not widely used.
Commentators7 and courts8 have paid little attention to them. But they are by
3. Statutes making a failure to obey a command of assistance a criminal offense include ALA. CODE
§ 13A-10-5 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.720 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2403 (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-54-109, 12-11-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 150 (West Supp. 1992); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-8-107 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167b (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1241
(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.06 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 710-1011 (Michie 1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-7 (Bums 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.2 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 30-A, § 402 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.230 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-
304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-903 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.270 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 594:6 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-2 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.10
(McKinney 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 537 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.245 (1991); TE.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 2.15 (West 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 301 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-463 (Michie 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-14 (1989).
4. My conversations with an unscientific selection ofjudges, law professors, attorneys, peace officers,
and ordinary citizens concerning the subject of this Essay suggest that few people-including members of
the legal profession-even realize that these laws exist. None of my informants had ever observed or heard
of an actual command of assistance other than those involved in the published cases cited in note 6, infra.
While published cases are a notoriously inaccurate reflection of events occurring in the real world, it seems
reasonably clear that commands of assistance are not given with great regularity.
5. In 13 years of practicing criminal law and three years as a state trial judge sitting periodically in
misdemeanor courts, the only command of assistance case I have ever encountered is State v. Floyd, 584
A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991), discussed in the text accompanying notes 13-15, infra.
6. The only published American cases sustaining convictions for refusing commands of assistance are
Dougherty v. State, 17 So. 393 (Ala. 1895); Coleman v. State, 63 Ala. 93 (1879); Wtlliams v. State, 490
S.W.2d 117 (Ark. 1973); State v. Santiago, 578 A.2d 668 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990), appeal dismissed, 590
A.2d 434 (Conn. 1991); State v. Deniston, 6 Blackf. 277 (Ind. 1842); State v. Ditmore, 99 S.E. 368 (N.C.
1919); State v. Shaw, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 20 (1842); Comfort v. Commonwealth, 5 Whart. 437 (Pa. 1840).
A conviction for this offense was reversed on statutory grounds in State v. Brown, 141 S.E.2d 311
(N.C. 1965). State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991), reversed a pretrial dismissal of a prosecution
for this offense.
Cases involving commands of assistance have come before the courts in three other contexts. First,
a number of persons responding affirmatively to such commands have been killed or injured, and either
they or their estates have subsequently sought compensation. See Monterey County v. Rader, 248 P. 912
(Cal. 1926); Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726 (N.Y. 1928); Riker v. City of New York, 126
N.Y.S.2d 229 (1953), aff'd, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 620 (1955); Tomlinson v. Town ofNorwood, 182 S.E. 659 (N.C.
1935); Mitchell v. Indus. Comm'n, 13 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936); Vilas County v. Monk, 228 N.W.
591 (Wis. 1930); Village of West Salem v. Indus. Comm'n, 155 N.W. 929 (Wis. 1916). Second, persons
killing or injuring those commanded have been criminally prosecuted. See Watson v. State, 3 So. 441 (Ala.
1888); Robinson v. State, 18 S.E. 1018 (Ga. 1893); State v Bertchey, 73 A. 524 (NJ. 1909); Common-
wealth v. Martin, 7 Pa. D. 219 (1898); State v. Halley, 31 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 73 (1847); Weatherford v. State,
21 S.W. 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893). Third, persons arrested by those commanded have sued the latter (with
an invariable lack of success) in trespass for damages. See Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 .J. Marsh) 44 (1829);
Firestone v. Rice, 38 N.W. 885 (Mich. 1888); Moyer v. Meier, 238 P.2d 338 (Old. 1951); Moyer v. Foster,
234 P.2d 415 (Old. 1951); Presley v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 145 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912);
McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69 (1861); Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151 (1847); cf. Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Johns.
84 (N.Y. 1813) (commanded person called as witness in suit against sheriff). The vast majority of these
cases are quite old, but a few are not.
7. There has been a great deal of writing, particularly in the last decade, on the Posse Comitatus Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988), which makes the willful use "of any part of the Army or the Air Force" to execute
civilian laws a criminal offense. See, e.g., Walter A. Lorence, The Constitutionality of the Posse Comitatus
Act, 8 U.K.C. L. REV. 164 (1939); Roger B. Hohnsbeen, Note, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus
Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1986);
Larry C. Boschee, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act As an Exclusionary Rule: Is the Criminal To Go Free
Because the Soldier Has Blundered?, 61 N.D. L. REV. 107 (1985). These works, however, have focused
on issues involving the application of the Posse Comitatus Act to various military and quasi-military
services. No scholarly article has dealt with the quite different constitutional problems discussed in this
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no means completely dormant, as I discovered when the case of State v. Floyd9
found its way to my docket. My decision in Floyd, which attempted to address
the problems inherent in these statutes, was reversed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court on procedural grounds10 In doing so, that court construed
Connecticut's commanding assistance statute rather narrowly in an effort to
preserve its constitutionality, but serious constitutional difficulties remain even
under its analysis. This Essay addresses some important problems that, for all
practical purposes, remain unaddressed and unresolved. The facts of State
v. Floyd provide a good starting point. 2
On August 5, 1989, an employee of the Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Compa-
ny named Michael Jamieson was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the
town of Southington, Connecticut. The Southington Police Department assigned
Officer Nicholas Spratto to investigate the accident. Officer Spratto determined
that Jamieson had committed a motor vehicle infraction.13 Officer Spratto went
to the Pratt and Whitney factory in Southington and confronted Jamieson.
Jamieson became obnoxious and refused to accept a ticket.
At this point, Officer Spratto went to Gregory Floyd, a uniformed Pratt and
Whitney security officer, and asked him what Pratt and Whitney's policy was
for dealing with disorderly employees. Floyd said he did not know and referred
Spratto to his supervisor, Kenneth Wright. Wright, also a uniformed security
employee, told Officer Spratto that the policy was to call the Southington Police
Department, a response which Officer Spratto of the Southington Police Depart-
ment apparently found unilluminating. Officer Spratto returned to Jamieson,
Essay, triggered by commands of assistance directed at civilians.
8. The only cases to have considered the constitutionality of commanding assistance laws are State
v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991), and Williams v. State, 490 S.W. 2d 117 (Ark. 1973). Floyd is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 13-15, infra. Williams dismissed most of the constitutional
arguments presented in rather summary fashion.
9. State v. Floyd, No. CR89-66843 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1990), rev'd, 584 A.2d 1157 (Conn.
1991).
10. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that I erred in dismissing a criminal case on the basis of
a statement of essential facts submitted by the prosecution pursuant to a Connecticut rule of practice rather
than holding an evidentiary hearing. Floyd, 584 A.2d at 1159.
11. Although profound ethical problems are plainly raised by the factual scenarios I discuss, my analysis
is a legal one. I do not address the citizen's moral duties to the state and to other citizens, for I view those
duties as matters of conscience. As will be seen, I conclude that in cases involving potential danger to the
summoned citizen, the decision should remain one of the citizen's conscience rather than one compelled
by law.
12. In giving this summary, I commit the same sin condemned by the Supreme Court of Connecticut
on appeal-relying on the prosecution's statement of essential facts. See supra note 10. I do this for three
reasons. First, the essential facts are a matter of public record, having been summarized in the opinion of
the Connecticut Supreme Court. See Floyd, 584 A.2d at 1159. Second, the parties gave me no reason to
believe that the alleged facts are inaccurate in any significant way. Third, even if the alleged facts are,
contrary to my impression, inaccurate, they nevertheless demonstrate what at least one prosecutor has
recently perceived to be a legitimate basis for prosecution.
13. An infraction in Connecticut is punishable by a maximum fine of $90. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-
164m(c) (1991).
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who at this point became unruly. Officer Spratto decided to arrest Jamieson for
breach of peace.
14
Jamieson, however, resisted arrest by struggling and fighting with Officer
Spratto. Unable to make the arrest singlehandedly without endangering himself,
Officer Spratto commanded three civilians to assist him: Floyd and Wright, the
uniformed security officers he had previously consulted, and John Paradis, a
maintenance supervisor wearing a jacket and tie. All three refused to help
Officer Spratto. Paradis stated that he could not do so. Eventually another
police officer arrived, and the officers took Jamieson into custody. The state
subsequently charged Floyd, Wright, and Paradis with the crime of failure to
assist a peace officer.
15
State v. Floyd presents a variation on the theme of the well-known motion
picture, High Noon. 6 In High Noon, the marshal of a small western town,
memorably played by Gary Cooper, attempts to raise a posse of special deputies
to subdue an outlaw scheduled to arrive on the noon train. None of the towns-
people will help him. Some people are simply apathetic, but most are afraid
or concerned for their wives and children. The marshal must eventually do the
job himself. It does not seem to have occurred to him that he could simply
arrest the citizens who refused to assist him. 7
We instinctively admire heroism, and the reluctance of citizens to put
themselves at risk to help an embattled peace officer hardly seems admirable.
It is, however, an understandable characteristic and one that is not unequivocal-
ly blameworthy. There have been, to be sure, instances of failure to assist others
that merit the strongest possible moral condemnation. The most celebrated
14. Id. § 53a-181. Breach of peace is a misdemeanor in Connecticut, punishable by up to six months
in prison. Id. § 53a-36.
15. Id. § 53a-167b. This statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of failure to assist a peace officer
or fireman when, commanded by a peace officer or fireman authorized to command assistance, he refuses
to assist such officer or fireman in the execution of his duties." A violation of this statute is a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year Id. § 53a-36. Section 53a-167b on its face applies only to
officers "authorized to command assistance" and does not itself grant such authorization. Section 7-276,
however, provides that members of municipal police departments "shall have all such authority with respect
to the service of criminal process and the enforcement of the criminal laws as is vested by the general
statutes in police officers and constables." Id. § 7-276. Section 7-90, in turn, specifically provides that,
"[a]ny constable, when necessary, may command any person to assist him in the execution of the duties
of his office." Id. § 7-90.
16. HIGH NOON (United Artists 1952). High Noon is perhaps better understood as an allegory of the
reluctance of the American people to come to the assistance of their friends during the McCarthy era than
as a description of exemplary law enforcement techniques. The screenwriter, Carl Foreman, was blacklisted
after writing the film for refusing to cooperate with the House Committee on Unamerican Activities. Amanda
Foreman, High Noon at the P.C. Corral, N.Y. TIMds, Mar. 20, 1991, at A29. High Noon's portrayal of a
peace officer's conduct has had at least one notable cinematic detractor. Howard Hawks was so infuriated
at what he perceived to be Gary Cooper's groveling behavior in High Noon that he made Rio Bravo "to
show that a professional lawman... wouldn't ask common folk for help against the gunmen." DANNY
PEARY, GUIDE FOR THE FILm FANATIC 194 (1986); Rio BRAVO (Warner Bros. 1958). The sheriff in Rio
Bravo, portrayed by John Wayne, dismissed the idea of commanding a citizen posse to resist the outlaws
threatening him, stating that, "What I'd have is some well-meaning amateurs, most of them worried about
their wives and kids."
17. It should be noted that the marshal in High Noon requested assistance rather than commanded it.
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instance that comes to mind is that of the thirty-seven New York City residents
who looked on from the safety of their apartments while Catherine Genovese
was murdered in 1964 and who did not even call the police.18 But the ficti-
tious townspeople who refused to assist the marshal in High Noon and the real
people who refused to assist Officer Spratto in State v. Floyd occupy a very
different place on the moral spectrum. For them, the requested acts of assistance
were not risk-free.
The outlaw in High Noon was a murderer accompanied by three friends,
all of whom carried guns and were willing to use them. Jamieson, the strug-
gling man in Floyd, was apparently unarmed, but there was no way safe way
to determine this fact in advance. Anyone who spends a single day in an
arraignment court in any present-day urban area will leave with the distinct
impression that the number of armed and dangerous people in our society is
appallingly high. Many people with whom I have discussed the Floyd scenario
have categorically stated that they would have refused a command to subdue
Jamieson for just this reason. There are, in any event, a number of documented
cases in which persons who have obeyed commands of assistance have been
killed or injured in the process.' 9 It is not entirely blameworthy for a fortu-
itously summoned citizen--and particularly one with a dependent spouse or
children-to decline to risk being added to the list.
This leads to a moral anomaly in the law. The neighbors who ignored
Catherine Genovese's screams and did not bother to call the police committed
no crime in doing so. They did not even breach any legal duty known to the
law of torts. The same is true of the hypothetical person known to law students
everywhere who declines to toss a lifesaver to a drowning man (assuming that
he did not place the man in danger in the first place). But the comparatively
less blameworthy person who refuses to assist a police officer in his dangerous
work is punished as a criminal. While the duty to assist a peace officer is
arguably an attribute of membership in an organized society, the justification
for this duty requires careful scrutiny.
The antecedents of existing commanding assistance statutes are centuries
old. Their origins lie not in the urban landscape of present-day America but in
the forests and walled cities of medieval England. Long before the creation of
18. See Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police: Apathy at Stabbing of Queens
Woman Shocks Inspector, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1. A 38th witness called the police after Ms.
Genovese was dead. Id. A thoughtful discussion of this famous case can be found in LEO KATZ, BAD ACTs
AND GUILTY MINDs 135-37 (1987).
19. See supra note 6.
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organized police forces,' the common law process of apprehending suspected
felons was the hue and cry.21 The person discovering a felony would raise a
cry of "Out! Out!" Prompting the neighbors to turn out with their bows, arrows,
and knives. The "hue" would be passed by horn-blowing from town to town
until the ad hoc posse caught the malefactor or gave up the chase. Any malefac-
tor overtaken would receive summary justice. A court would hurriedly assemble
for the purpose and, without allowing the defendant to say anything in his
defense, the crowd would promptly hang the defendant, behead him, or hurl
him from a cliff.' The victim of the crime would sometimes have the honor
of acting as amateur executioner.23
This was, as Pollock and Maitland aptly put it, "barbaric justice,"'
stripped of any semblance of what would now be considered due process and
hearkening back to ancient times in its swiftness and brutality. But the hue and
cry was not out of place in feudal society. Obligations to participate in the
peace-keeping functions of that society were widespread. In the absence of a
professional army, the duty of military service was rooted in the tenure of
land.2s Similarly, the absence of a professional constabulary meant that all
citizens were expected to pursue and capture outlaws, killing them if neces-
sary.2 More generally, perceived notions of communitarianism were very
strong.27 In fact, if a malefactor was not caught by the hue and cry, a financial
20. The hue and cry is mentioned in THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF
ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANViLL 175 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1983), and 2 HENRY BRACTON, ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 350 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).
21. "Hue" derives from the French huer, meaning "to shout."
22. The form of punishment varied with the locality. "In some sea-port towns the criminal was tied
to a stake below high-water mark and left to drown. At Winchester, he was mutilated .... Burying alive
seems to have been practiced at Sandwich, Lyon, Dover" 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC NV.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 496 n.7 (2d ed. 1905).
23. Id. at 578-79.
24. Id. at 579.
25. lid. at 252.
26. Id. at 476-77.
27. One way to think of the role of the individual in medieval society is in terms of the sculptures in
a medieval cathedral. In these sculptures, the human body is typically conventionalized into a column, giving
the statues the appearance "of forming part of the building and of sustaining it." The individual is an organic
part of the architecture as a whole. MARGARET MARRIAGE & ERNEST MARRIAGE, THE SCULPTURES OF
CHARTRES CATHEDRAL 22 (1909). The idea of communitarianism has enjoyed a scholarly resurgence in
recent years, and the communitarian-liberal debate among legal theorists has resulted in a prodigious amount
of scholarship. Compare, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE
L.L 1 (1989), and authorities discussed therein with Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989
Term--Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990). Much of this debate concerns
problems of political deliberation, the equality of political actors, and participation in governmental processes
that are well beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541-42 (1988). Of course, my approach to the Fourth Amendment might fairly be
termed a liberal one in that I view that amendment as giving the individual a certain autonomy from the
state and, in terms of the ethical problems raised by the factual scenarios I discuss, an ability to define his
own values. See supra note 11. But the existence of this contemporary debate should not obscure the fact
that the communitarian notions of the Middle Ages originated in a"feudal world of sect, family and guild,"
Kahn, supra, at 63, vastly different from the world of individual rights secured by the written constitution
of the nation state that we now inhabit
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penalty would be levied on the entire township.2
In 1275, the first Parliament of Edward I, perceiving that participation in
the hue and cry was declining, obliged citizens to join in the process by force
of positive law, and gave sheriffs the power to command such pursuits.2 9 The
First Statute of Westminster provided: "That all generally be ready and appar-
elled, at the Commandment and Summons of Sheriffs, and at the Cry of the
Country, to sue and arrest felons, when any need is ... and they that will not
do so ...shall make a grievous fine to the King."30 Ten years later, the
Statute of Winchester not only affirmed the obligation of the populace to join
in the hue and cry, but also commanded every man between fifteen and sixty
years of age to have in his house a quantity of arms "to keep the Peace."
Wealthy subjects were required to keep "an Hauberke, a Breast-plate of Iron,
a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse." The less wealthy were obliged to keep
swords, knives, bows, and arrows.31
The Statutes of Westminster and Winchester were, in Bishop Stubbs'
words, "monument[s) of the persistence of primitive institutions working their
way through the superstratum of feudalism and gaining strength in the pro-
cess. 32 Those monuments would not only stand in England for centuries,33
but they cast their lengthy shadows across the Atlantic as well. In 1641,' the
Colony of Massachusetts ordered that "all Hue & cries shall be duly received
and diligently pursued to full effect."35 That simple statute was followed in
1646 by a considerably more colorful enactment:
[E]verie Constable within our Jurisdiction shall henceforth have full
power to make, signe & put forth Pursutes or Hue-&-cries after Mur-
28. 2 BRACTON, supra note 20, at 350.
29. First Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw., ch. 9.
30. Id.
31. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. I, ch. 6. There is evidence that this statute was intended in
large part to keep the peace while Edward went abroad to Gascony. MAURICE POWICKE, THE THIRTEENTH
CENTURY 357 (1962).
32. WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS 288, 293 (1870).
33. The arms provisions of the Statute of Winchester were repealed in the 17th century, but English
sheriffs retained their statutory power to command the citizenry to arrest felons until 1967. In 1939, the
Privy Council warned the sheriffs that they might have to command the civilian population to assist them
in defending their counties should an invasion occur. 42 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 558 (4th ed.
1983). English constables are still thought to have the power to call vpon bystanders to assist them in cases
of reasonable necessity, 11(1) HAISBuRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 255 (4th ed. reissue 1990), although no
English court has been called on to enforce this power since the mid-19th century. See Queen v. Sherlock,
1 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. (1866); Regina v. Brown, 174 Eng. Rep. 522 (1841).
34. At the time of this New World legislation, the most distinguished legal commentators in England
unquestioningly accepted the medieval law of the hue and cry. Edward Coke, who died in 1634, summoned
a characteristically impressive array of medieval precedent of the hue and cry in his Second Institutes. 2
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *171-73. Matthew Hale, a young lawyer at the
time, later invoked Bracton and the Statutes of Westminster and Winchester as decisive on the issue. 2
MATIHEWV HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *98-99. Over a century later, William
Blackstone, relied similarly on this medieval legislation, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *290.
35. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS 13 (photo. reprint 1929) (1648).
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therers, Manslayers, Peace-breakers, Theevs, Robbers, Burglarers and
other Capital offenders, where no Magistrate is neer hand .... And
if it appear by good testimonie, that any shal wilfully, obstinately or
contemptuously refuse or neglect to assist any Constable... he shall
pay to the use of the Country fourty shillings. And that no man may
plead ignorance for such neglect or refusal, it is ordered that everie
Constable shall have a black staffe of five foot long, tipped at the
upper end, about five inches with brasse, as a badge of his office,
which he shal take with him when he goeth to discharge any part of
his office.36
The Colony of Connecticut passed similar legislation (omitting the black
staff requirement) in 1650.37 As noted at the beginning of this Essay,8 most
states now require similar duties of their citizens as expressed in somewhat
more modern statutory language.
This is an impressive lineage entitled to considerable respect, even if one
is not Justice Scalia.39 In the words of Justice Holmes, "If a thing has been
practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.' ° However, while the antiquity
of a practice plainly creates a presumption of the practice's continued validi-
ty,41 it is not necessarily conclusive in constitutional adjudication. That much,
at least, continues to be acknowledged by a clear majority of a Supreme Court
36. Id.
37. 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 522 (1850).
38. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
39. Cf., Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1047-54 (1991) (Scalia, 3., concurring)
(arguing that traditional practice of allowing juries to determine punitive damages does not violate due
process); Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109-17 (1990) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.)
(reviewing historical support for notion that service of process confers state court jurisdiction over physically
present nonresidents); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-27 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia,
J.) (tracing law's history of respect for marital family as far back as Bracton).
40. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). It is, however, far from clear that the power
to command assistance has been practiced by anything approaching common consent during the past 200
years. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
41. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043 (majority opinion); id. at 1065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The
existence of this presumption is clear, but its exact rationale has never been fully articulated. Original intent
is one of its bases, for if a particular practice was widespread in 1791 or 1868 when the Bill of Rights and
the 14th Amendment were respectively ratified, the Framers of those amendments likely understood that
practice to be prevailing and did not intend to overturn it. See, e.g., id. at 1043; Michael H., 491 U.S. at
127 n.6 (Scalia, 3.); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986). But the Supreme Court has
periodically looked to "history" and "tradition" in a way that does not exclusively, or even primarily, focus
on the Framers' intent. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(invoking "respect for the teachings of history"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)
(invoking "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental"). Perhaps the best that can be said is that the longer a practice has endured, the more
"historical" or "traditional" it has become, and the more reluctant a court will be to overturn it. Much,
however, depends on the particular constitutional provision in question. In due process cases, the presump-
tion of validity accorded a practice with deep historical roots will be high. An analysis of an express
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, however, must ultimately turn on the language and meaning of that
guarantee, even if the language and meaning are counterhistorical. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1052 (opinion
of Scalia, J.).
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not otherwise known for its aversion to antiquity.42 As the Court said in some-
what more venturesome days, there is a "need to be open to reassessment of
ancient practices other than those explicitly mandated by the Constitution.' 43
Justice Holmes also wrote:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 4
The history of commanding assistance laws suggests that the grounds upon
which those laws were laid down have indeed long since vanished. Consequent-
ly, a reassessment of the ancient practice of summoning the populace to
apprehend criminals is in order.
The society of thirteenth-pentury England that produced the Statutes of
Westminster and Winchester differed in many ways from seventeenth-century
Massachusetts and Connecticut, which enacted the statutory antecedents of
modem American commanding assistance legislation. Yet, although centuries
apart, these societies did share two important characteristics. Neither had any
sort of organized police force or tradition of individual constitutional rights.
Profound changes have since occurred with respect to each of these characteris-
tics.
Organized police forces are a product of the nineteenth century.45 Prior
to that time, the relatively few constables, sheriffs, and watchmen in existence
could not be expected to keep the peace by themselves.46 If the peace was to
be kept at all, it was because armed citizens were ready to respond to the hue
42. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043 (majority opinion); id. at 1065 (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
43. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240 (1970). Williams was favorably cited by the majority in
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043, and extensively relied upon by Justice O'Connor in her dissent, id. at 1065-66.
44. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
45. The first organized police force of the sort that we would now recognize was established in London
by An Act for improving the Police in and near the Metropolis, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, ch. 44. The act was the
brainchild of the Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, and British policemen are to this day known as bobbies.
46. The peace officers of the time were not merely few in number. "[E]ighteenth Century constables
were so poorly paid that only old men could afford to take the job." Comment, An Historical Argument
for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.. 1000, 1035 n.200 (1964). Deputy
constables, in many instances, were "characters of the worst and lowest description; having no salary, but
living by extortion, and countenancing all species of vice." John Timbs, Curiosities of London 682 (2d ed.
1867). The preface to An Act for improving the Police in and near the Metropolis, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, ch.
44, states that the previously existing Nightly Watch and Nightly Police were inadequate, among other
reasons, "by reason of the frequent Unfitness of the Individuals employed [and] the Insufficiency of their
Number." Id.; see also WELLAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 4, sc. 2, at 80 (Yale
University Press 1917) (1600) (remarks of Constable Dogberry).
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and cry.47 This is no longer the case. Our society now has large, organized,
well-equipped and well-trained federal, state, and local police forces to keep
the peace. At the same time, law-abiding citizens are no longer expected to be
armed, much less trained in the use of arms. Indeed, most states now make it
a crime to carry a concealed weapon, and some criminalize the carrying of
unconcealed weapons without a permit 8 If modem peace officers had to rely
upon the ancient power of raising the county, they would no longer have the
sword-wielding, hauberke-clad citizens of medieval England at their beck and
call. The persons much more likely to be bearing arms would be the persons
being pursued.49
The establishment of organized police forces and the statutory disarmament
of the populace are not the only significant developments that have occurred
since the enactment of the colonial antecedents to modem commanding assis-
tance laws. The United States now has a two-centuries-old written constitution
that contains explicit guarantees of individual rights. The Fourth Amendment
and the requirements of due process restrict the power of the state in ways that
call for a reconsideration of the duties and the risks that the state has historical-
ly been able to impose on its citizenry.
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons.., against unreasonable... seizures, shall not be violated."50
Although we ordinarily think of the Fourth Amendment in terms of police
activities directed at persons suspected of crime, its text is not so limited. The
47. The 17th-century concept of the militia provides a significant parallel to this state of affairs. Public
sentiment at the time of the Constitution's adoption "strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view
was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia-civilians primarily,
soldiers on occasion." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1938). This view is reflected in the
preamble to the Second Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State"). Professor Levinson has noted that "[t]here is strong evidence that 'militia'
refers to all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the community." Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.L 637, 646-47 (1989). In contrast, an "army"
was feared, as Professor Amar has recently observed, because "[i]t was not composed of a randomly
conscripted cross-section... but was instead filled with hired guns." Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1169 (1991); see also Henry W. Longfellow, Paul Revere's Ride,
in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF LONGFELLOW 207 (1940). In modem times, of course, we have
the very sort of standing army that the founding fathers opposed, and no true citizen militia has been
summoned in many years.
48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206 (1991) (making it criminal, punishable by three years in
prison, to carry any "dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument' without written permit). It is well known
to anyone who watches current television news broadcasts that many police organizations are prominent
supporters of proposed federal and state legislation further restricting handgun ownership.
49. In addition, the weapons wielded by the persons being pursued are much more powerful than they
once were. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1985). It is not uncommon for an urban criminal
to have at his disposal firepower that would make a police department envious.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Most state constitutions contain analogous provisions. See, e.g., CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 7. ("The people shall be secure in their persons ... from unreasonable.. . seizures ....").
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text is explicitly concerned with the security of the person.' It has been clear
since Terry v. Ohio5 2-and this much, at least, remains unaltered by California
v. Hodari D. 3-that "the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person
that do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime."-'4 The "'seizures' of the person" that the Fourth Amendment governs
are those defined by the common law of arrest.55 This concept includes not
only physical restraints, but submissions to the assertion of authority.56 The
Supreme Court stated in Terry that when an officer by a show of authority "has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen... a 'seizure' has occurred.,
57
Hodari D. adds that the restraint must be a successful one: that is, either the
citizen whom the officer is seeking to restrain must submit to the restraint or
the officer must use physical force.58 Neither the Fourth Amendment's text
nor the line of cases from Terry to Hodari D. limits the prohibition on restraints
to those imposed on persons suspected of a crime.59 Rather, as the text of the
amendment emphatically informs us, freedom from unreasonable restraints
affecting the security of the person 0 is "[t]he right of the people."
'61
The implications of this doctrine for commands of assistance are reasonably
clear. If submission to an assertion of authority constitutes a seizure, so does
a command of assistance to which the commanded person submits.6 2 The
51. The Supreme Court has voiced concern-expressed in terms more philosophical than textual-when
it has considered cases involving actual invasions of the physical person. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (surgery); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test).
52. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
53. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). Hodari D.'s favorable discussion of Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593
(1989), makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment concept of "seizure" extends to successful (if that is the
word for roadblocks that cause fatal accidents) demonstrations of authority that could not be described as
arrests in the colloquial (as distinct from the legal) sense of the word. See Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
Both opinions were written by Justice Scalia.
54. Teny, 392 U.S. at 16.
55. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3.
56. Id. at 1551.
57. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
58. HodariD., 1i1 S. Ct. at 1551. This qualification, while clear enough from HodariD., is a troubling
one for purposes of my analysis. The application of the Fourth Amendment "seizure" provision requires
some physical restraint, yet only persons who submit to commands of assistance have suffered such restraint.
In this way, persons not submitting to such commands risk criminal prosecution without a Fourth Amend-
ment defense. See supra note 3. This is not an equitable state of affairs, but it in no way alters the fact that
successful commands of assistance affecting the security of the person are Fourth Amendment "seizures."
59. If anything, of course, persons not suspected of crime should be more free, rather than less free,
from official restraint. Although the Supreme Court has occasionally suggested that the principal concern
of the Fourth Amendment is with "criminal investigations," Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42
(1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977), those suggestions came in cases having nothing
to do with the police. Police-imposed restraints that threaten personal security are another matter altogether.
60. Not all restraints affect the security of the person. Subpoenas that command an individual to appear
and give some types of evidence in court are unquestionably restraints on liberty but are not Fourth
Amendment "seizures." See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1972) (compelled voice exemplars
involved no intrusion on dignity and privacy). Restraints that affect the security of the person are entirely
different.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Hodari D. necessarily implies that a command of assistance to which the commanded person does
not submit is not a "seizure." Of course, in that event, the commanded person will, in most jurisdictions,
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commanded person is certainly not free to leave. 3 If he refuses to obey the
command, he will, at least in most jurisdictions, find himself in the dock. If
he obeys it, and the command is anything like the one given Floyd, Wright,
and Paradis, the security of his person may be in considerable jeopardy.
This is not simply a matter of the bumps and bruises that might ordinarily
be expected to accompany the apprehension of a struggling criminal. The real
danger is that the person to be apprehended may be armed and that there is
often no way to ascertain this fact in advance. As noted above,64 there are a
number of known instances in which persons obeying commands of assistance
have been killed or seriously injured. The frightening array of weaponry now
available on urban streets and the impulsiveness with which that weaponry is
often used only increase this danger. Under these circumstances, an attempt by
an unarmed civilian to apprehend a suspected criminal is a form of Russian
roulette.
A person against whom the police have used deadly force has been "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.65 A person commanded by the
police to risk death or injury should not receive different Fourth Amendment
treatment.
Commands of assistance raise profound questions of substantive due
process as well, for as the Supreme Court recognized in Cruzan v. Director,66
seizures of the body have long been thought to "implicate substantial liberty
interests. ' 67 Justice O'Connor succinctly stated in her Cruzan concurrence that
"our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination." 68
The equation of liberty with personal security is as old as the Magna Charta
and its declaration that "[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned.., but by
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."'69 There is reason to
believe that this equation underlies, at least to some extent, the right to "life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness" recognized in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration, was well acquainted with
have committed a crime. See supra notes 3, 58.
63. Prior to Hodari D. this was the definition-or at least the apparent definition-of a Fourth
Amendment "seizure." See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). Hodari D. holds that this test "states
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for seizure." Ill S. Ct. at 1151.
64. See supra note 6.
65. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
66. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
67. Id. at 2851.
68. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, ., concurring).
69. 10 HALSBURY'S STATUTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES 15-16 (4th ed. 1985) (emphasis added); see
also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.41 (1977); Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the
Term "Liberty" in those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and
Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (1891).
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the work of Francis Hutcheson, an influential Scottish philosopher of the
time.70 Hutcheson viewed the right to life as involving not "being exposed to
death, or wounds" 71 and the right to what he called "natural liberty" as requir-
ing that one's actions not "be under the direction of others."72
Cruzan echoes these concerns by invoking the common law73 and due
process74 notions of bodily integrity. The Court found the high standard of
proof that Missouri required before allowing Nancy Cruzan to die justified by
her "deeply personal" interest in "[tihe choice between life and death."75 All
of the above makes clear that state actions directly threatening the security of
the person are subject to the demands of due process.
Of course, a determination that a person has been "seized" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment or has a "liberty" interest for purposes of due process
does not end the inquiry. In each context, established doctrine requires that the
constitutional status of the relevant practice-i.e., whether the seizure is unrea-
sonable for Fourth Amendment purposes or whether the practice violates the
demands of substantive due process-be ascertained by a balancing of compet-
ing interests.7 6 In the context of commands of assistance, the competing inter-
ests are the liberty and Fourth Amendment interests of the person commanded,
on the one hand, and the governmental interests that assertedly justify the
command, on the other.77
A balancing process of this description inescapably involves judgment calls.
Distinctions can, however, be made. Because the Fourth Amendment and the
historical understanding of liberty focus particularly on the security and integri-
ty of the person, we can distinguish between commands of assistance that
involve danger to the person commanded and those that do not. An officer's
command to a bystander to telephone 911 is unlikely to expose that bystander
to any danger. On the other hand, an officer's command to a bystander to
subdue a struggling criminal or to take someone into custody presents a very
real possibility of danger.
Recall that it was the presence or absence of danger that created the moral
distinction between the persons who heard Catherine Genovese scream and did
not call the police, and the persons who refused to assist the marshal in High
70. A number of Hutcheson's works were in the library Jefferson sold to Congress. Following that sale,
Jefferson repurchased two of Hutcheson's works for his personal library. GARRY WILLS, hiNENTING
AMERICA 201 (1978).
71. FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 293 (1755).
72. Id. at 294. Blackstone, at about the same time, opined that "the residuum of natural liberty, which
is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience" includes both the right of
"personal security" and the right of "personal liberty." I BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *129.
73. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990).
74. Id. at 2851.
75. Id. at 2852.
76. Id. at 2851-52 and authorities cited therein (due process); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)
(Fourth Amendment).
77. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (Fourth Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (due process).
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Noon or Officer Spratto in the Floyd case.7 The presence or absence of dan-
ger is important for Fourth Amendment and due process purposes as well.
When a command of assistance presents a significant possibility of danger to
the person commanded-and the contemporary prevalence of concealed weap-
ons transforms any command to take another person into custody into such a
command-the government must have a weighty interest to justify that com-
mand. The modem development of organized police forces has diminished this
interest considerably. At the same time, the danger to the unarmed, untrained
citizen in assuming law enforcement work has become more substantial. Such
commands are therefore no longer consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution.
It should not be inferred from this analysis that the government may never
require the citizen to submit himself to danger. All citizens of this country, in
the language of the Selective Draft Law Cases,79 have the "supreme and noble
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation.""0
Military service, however, is a special case. Congress has express constitu-
tional authority to raise and support armies.81 This power is vital to our na-
tion's existence, which is a prerequisite for the existence of our constitutional
liberties.8 2 Citizen posses lack such a compelling justification. They are neither
authorized by any express constitutional provision, nor, given the rise of
organized police forces, needed to keep the peace. Moreover, the Military
Selective Service Act 3 has historically employed a highly regulated procedure,
carefully delineating the persons liable for training and service, the manner of
their selection, and the appropriate deferments and exemptions. 84 Commands
of assistance are subject to none of these refinements but instead rely on the
summary, ad hoe, and unreviewable decisions of police officers on the beat.
A person drafted for military service can go to an administrative board and
show good cause, at least within statutory limits, as to why he should not be
inducted. His counterpart summoned by a peace officer has no such recourse.
78. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
79. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
80. Id. at 390.
81. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
82. For a powerful discussion of this requirement, see Abraham Lincoln, Opinion on the Draft,
reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRrriNGs, 1859-1865, at 504-09 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1989).
83. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1988).
84. This is not to say that the draft law has been in any way a model of fairness, for inequities like
the exclusion of women and the student deferment in the Vietnam War (not to mention the outright purchase
of deferments in the Civil War) have existed throughout its history. These inequities, however, have at least
had the virtue of being publicly acknowledged products of deliberate congressional choice. The existence
of considered exemptions and procedures gives the system some minimal evenhandedness of application.
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Given these facts, the more accurate analogy to the command of assistance
is not the military draft but the notorious British practice of impressment, an
institution which the Founding Fathers abhorred.8" That ordinary citizens
should be subject to summary impressment into hazardous police duty is
inconsistent with our basic notions of constitutional liberty.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut took a somewhat different view of these
issues in the Floyd case. Recognizing the serious constitutional issues raised
by the case, the court chose to address them by construing Connecticut's
commanding assistance statute 7 as authorizing such commands "only when
such assistance is both demonstrably necessary and reasonable under all the
circumstances."88 This approach has the virtue of appearing to be reasonable,
but it is in fact a troubling means of dealing with a practice that by its nature
requires split-second decisions involving the safety of the person, where the
person commanded will have no ready means of identifying a deficient com-
mand.89 Judges, prosecutors, and peace officers have for years voiced the
concern that Fourth Amendment law is too confusing to be understood by
policemen on the beat.90 A generalized rule of reasonableness reduces the law
to a morass where no one, policeman or citizen, can determine his rights and
responsibilities in advance. Moreover, as Professor Amsterdam has observed:
If there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and
may not do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did was
unreasonable. The ultimate conclusion is that "the people would be
'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the
discretion of the police."91
It would be far better to have some hard and fast rules that citizens of this
country could intelligently follow. Given the realities of modem life, it be-
hooves us to decree that commands of assistance that subject the person
commanded to the possibility of personal danger are inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment and the commands of due process.
85. See Amar, supra note 47, at 1168 n.175.
86. State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167b (1991).
88. Floyd, 584 A.2d at 1167. The court listed a number of factors that it thought relevant to determina-
tions of necessity and reasonableness, such as the urgency of the situation, the availability of other officers,
and the presence of weapons, but it emphasized that these factors were not exclusive. Id.
89. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
90. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1989-91 (1991); Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443,
520-21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
91. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349,394 (1974)
(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
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This Essay has not considered the question of whether the townspeople who
refused to come to the assistance of the marshal in High Noon or their modem
counterparts in the Pratt and Whitney factory visited by Officer Spratto were
right or wrong in a moral sense.92 That is a question that the dictates of con-
science must answer. But constitutional law can and must answer the question
of the rights of these citizens. The Framers of our Constitution, in the classic
words of the Court in Ex parte Milligan,93 "were guarding the foundations of
civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power."' It is a misuse of power
in modem society for an agent of the state to summarily draft a citizen off the
street and impress him into hazardous police duty. Our security does not
demand that the government be given such power. "If this were true," the
Milligan Court observed, "it could be well said that a country, preserved at the
sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preser-
vation. Happily, it is not so."95
92. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
93. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
94. Id. at 126.
95. Id. The Court was referring to the proposed suspension of the right to a trial by jury in time of
war.
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